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Pragmatistic Pragmatics 
Choon -Kyu Oh 
Charles Morris Cl938) divided a linguist's meaning-related task into three branches-
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Syntax in Morris' characterization deals exclusively 
with relations between linguistic expressions, and semantics with relations between expres-
sions and whatever are considered to be their meanings. Pragmatics has to do _ with rela-
tions among expressions, their meanings, and users and/ or contexts of use of those ex-
pressions. 
In one of his early papers, Bar-HillelCl954) proposed , that pragmatics coverj the 
study of indexical expressions, expressions whose reference cannot be determined without 
knowledge of the context of use. However, Richard Montague and his colleagues laid the 
foundations for what is now known as indexical semantics in the -general framework of 
model-theory. An example representative of Montague's view of pragmatics is found in 
the paper entitled 'Universal Grammar', where he distinguished senses from meanings. 
The former are defined to be functions of a possible world while the latter as functions 
of two arguments-a possible world and a context of use . Due to this precise technical 
structure given to the indexical semantics, Richmond Thomason suggested that the study 
of the meanings of indexical expressions be treated in the semantic component rather than 
in the pragmatic one in a general program of natural language analysis. While this leaves 
for a genuinely pragmatic theory the study of presupposition, speech acts conditions, and 
implicatures, we need to have a better understanding of what these apparently disparate 
subjects represent from some underlying holistic structure of pragmatics. 
StalnakerCl971 ) in a similar vein viewed the major task of pragmatics as one of 
definitizing a proposition for a given interpreted sentence. Stalnaker's and Thomason's 
suggestions taken together carve out a rather intriguing research area for a pragmati:stic 
linguist like myself. Talking about pragmatistic pragmatician, I am not just playing ~ith 
words. Many of us, professional linguists who are concerned with the immediate future of 
our better students have been driven into ~ pragmatistic view, a view that forces them 
into a search for some more marketable research area in which our students can still be 
engaged in an intellectually rewarding and challenging enterprise, still working on theoretic 
aspects of natural language studies. Thus the term pragmatism. I mean to refer by the 
term to a theoretical attitude that tends to appraise the value of a conception according to 
its practical results or effects . 
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For the reasons to be made clear, I am going to call the kind of pragmatics alluded 
to above pragmatistic pragmatics. Pragmatistic .pragmatics deals with those aspects of nat-
ural language meaning that crucially depend on some features of the context of use but 
not amenable to any rigorous formal treatment known to-date such as model-theoretic 
treatment. 
One example of pragmatistic pragmatics has to do with ellipsis. While the indexical 
semantics is also concerned with definitizing a proposition for a given interpreted sentence, 
the definitization in indexical semantics is carried out on a general level in terms of some 
general complexes of relevant aspects of intended possible contexts of use. These complexes 
are sometimes called indices or points of reference. Pramatistic pragmatics has to do with 
definitizing propositions on a not so general level. One example of ellipsis is taken from 
McCawley (1981). Consider the following analysis of the definite description in Russellian 
traditon expressed here in the restricted quantification notation. 
(1) The dog is hungry. (1x Dogx) Hungryx 
(2) The dog likes all dogs. ('x Dogx & *x) (Vy Dogy) Likex/ 
According to the \lsual model-theoretic semantics, sentence ( 1) can be assigned a truth 
condhion in such a way that it comes out true iff there is one and only one object in the 
value s~t of dog and that object is an element of the value set of hungry. 
But such a scheme does a gross violation to our intuition when we ' consider a sen-
tence such as (2) . If a plural NP requires a non-singleton set as it.s extension, sentence 
-. (2) expresses ~ contradict\on. One way of avoiding the problem might be by having con-
text domain distinctly from discourse domain, the former being a rather volatile member 
of the power set of the latter. Several context domains might be activated simultaneously 
in interpreting a sentence. One might provide a set of activation conditions as a way of 
selecting a particular subset of the discourse domain as a context domain for a particular 
expression. Much simpler and more intuitive it seems to me at the moment is it to deal 
with the semantics of sentence (2) in terms of ellipsis . The sentence then is interpreted 
as asserting that the intersection set between the set of dogs and the extension set of some 
property or property set to be specified contextually or discoursewise is a singleton set and 
its unique element is in the like relation with all the dogs in the domain. Such a pragmatic 
property set is also needed for an adequate analysis of modal expressions in choosing a 
particular subset of the total set of possible worlds in interpreting a specific modality in-
volved. It is necessary for a comprehensive treatment of predicate adjectives. In his paper 
entitled ' 'English as a formal language', Montague(1970) gave the semantics of sentences 
containing predicate adjectives in one of the rules (Sl7) , which makes (3) synonymous 
with (4) . 
1 till' represents the context property tha t is involn d in interpreting an expression. 
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(3 ) The elephant IS small. 
(4) The elephant IS a small entity. 
Under this analysis, we have some basis for an account of our intuition involving 
the foll\lwing two sentences: 
(5 ) Kim is a more brilliant AI researcher than his father. 
(6) Kim is an AI researcher who is more brilliant than his father. 
While sentence (5) clearly entails that Kim' s father is also an AI researcher, sentence (6) 
leaves his profession unspecified. It is not difficult to invent a truth condition for a sen-
tence containing an attributive adjective as in (5) so that attention may be limited to the 
set of AI researcheors. Montague' s rule assigns/ provides a distinct context domain for a 
sentence involving a predicate adjective as in sentence (6) . Here the focussed context do-
main is the discourse domain itself. But Montague's analysis of predicate adjectives needs 
to be further fine-tuned. Sentence (3) can be quite natural despite the truth condition 
forced upon it by Montague, according to whom the sentence may be true only in a bizarre 
situation. The sentence might be used to assert that a particular elephant is small as an 
elephant, as a mammal, as a jungle animal, or in a more bizarre· context indeed as an 
entity. In determining what proposition is intended by the utterance of the sentence in a 
given context, one needs to know the intended context domain which the elliptic '*2' is 
to supply in the following representation: 
Ellipsis is only a special case of pramatistic pragmatics. Majority of examples o~ 
what is known as presupposition also illustrate pragmatistic pragmatics in that they also 
involve some specific contextual features which limit the set of possible worlds to be con-
sidered in determining a particular subset of it which constitutes the proposition in question. 
One might object to the inclusion of presupposition in pramatistic pragmatics on the basis 
of Karttunen and Peter's(1979) model-theoretic treatment of the so-called conventional 
implicature they presented in their celebrated paper 'Conventional Implicature'. But Kart-
tunen and Peters' program does not seem to be necessary with all its complexity or ade-
quate if the program is to be ambitious enough to cover more than just the semantic p're-
supposition. Assuming that individual items and certain constructions need to be associated 
with certain implicatures, the tremendous complication due to the introduction of heritage 
features we maintain is too exorbitant a price to pay for the resolution of presupposition 
problem. But for the cancellation phenomenon, Langendoen and Savin' s(l971) straightfor-
ward cumulative project would have sufficed. This cancellation problem has been attacked 
in a way that does not involve as much complication in Gazdar (1979) and Oh & Godden 
(1979) . The latter paper attempts to resolve the projection problem of presupposition in 
terms of some natural principle governing human behavior in general much in harmony 
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with the Gricean principles. 
Karttunen and Peter's program need to be made more sensitive to certain contextual 
features in order to be pragmatically adequate. While it is true that sentence (8) does not 
semantically presuppose that someone other than Tom is expected to have left, in majority 
(8) John asserts that even Tom left. 
of contexts the use of the se~tence does carry that presupposition. It does not seem to be 
too unreasonable a demand on an adequate semantic theory to be discerning as to the 
relations between certain contextual features and presence/ absence of certain presuppositions. 
A fuller understanding of pragmatic meanings of an expression seems to involve a 
large number ·of underlying principles governing human behavior in general. Gricean 
maxims and the principle discussed in Oh & Godden(979) are some examples. The 
versatility of human commun~cation . is another aspect that should be kept in mind. This 
versatility is demonstrated in the use of so-called pronouns of laziness, in the attributive 
use of defin.ite descriptions, and in presupposition-turned assertion situations. 
(9) Is Alexander his last name or first name? 
(10) The man in the purple turtleneck shirt might have been someone else. 
{ll ) I regret (to inform) that children are not admitted to this party. 
. , 
In (9) , we have an example of dual referencing, the noun Alexander referring to the 
person and his name all at the same time. One reading of sentence (0) is a rather un-
realistic one, viz. that it is possible that a certain individual might have been an exception 
to the reflexivity of identity relation. A more reasonable reading is that a certain person 
has the property" of being a unique man in the 'purple turtlenck shirt but that someone 
else might have had that same property. McCawley's(981) analysis of a predicatively 
used definite description does not help here. McCawley proposes to translate the sentence 
form in (12) to (l3b) rather than more conventional (l3a). 
(12) Z is the Y. 
(13) a. (I" Yx} z=x 
b. Y. & (Vx Yx ) x=z 
While this general scheme can be tempered with so that it can produce the desired 
translation in ( l4a), it has an insurmountable problem when it comes to the negation. 
How should one translate (15) ? Neither the negation of the first conjunct nor that of the 
second conjunct does justice to our intuition. The reading corresponding to the internal 
negati·on in Russellian notation is not available. 
(14) a. (axMx) ((VyMy) (x=y) & O P ((a y x=;i::y)My & (V,M,) z=y)) 
b. (a x) CM" & CVy) (Mx::::Jx=y) & O P ((ay)X=;i:: y & x=y)) 
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(15) Z is not the Y. 
Therefore if we want (14a) as a reading of (10) , we must resort to some other scheme. 
I have a strong suspicion that here again we have a case of the versatility of human 
communication; in the last conjunct of the more conventional translation (I4b) the first 
occurrence of the variable x is referentially used while the second one attributively in 
Donnellan's sense, all made possible through the versatility of human language. In the 
normal context , sentence (ll) would be used to express the speaker's feeling (of regret) 
toward an event or state that is already presupposed, but people use the sentence often 
to inform what is supposedly already presupposed. We see a form of meta-rule taking 
advantage of a system of rules for a side effect, once again demonstrating the versatility 
of the language use. 
Paradoxically enough the examples of human versatility in the language use together 
with the tremendous complexity of pragmatistic pragmatics reveal the indispensibility of 
the use of the nonhuman tool, the computer. The practically unlimited memory space 
and speed as well as the blind obedience (or put it differently the lack of versatility in 
the sense used above) make the computer an extremely useful , tool for pragmatistic 
pramgatics as it has proven to be for other areas. 
Now the promised justification for the term the pragmatistic pragmatics. Due to the 
tendency away from mere academic pursuits in the general public and governments in the 
way of research funding and students' selection of their majoring fields, the discipline of 
linguistics is experiencing some unprecedented strain as is the case with many other hu-
manity disciplines. Those few who simply had to turn to linguistics due to their almost 
fatelike desire to study human language on theoretic realm are increasingly threatened 
with the gloomy prospect of joblessness and impossibility to support their family in case 
they were brave enough to choose to have one. More timid ones turn away to some more 
marketable areas with the love of natural language study still in their heart. Until we 
explore more deeply into pragmatistic pragmatics, linguistics would remain virtually un-
reachable from the practically unlimited resources which are just as eager to reach us as we 
are to interest them for future generations of linguists. It is not an accident that many 
theory-oriented linguists turn to the newly emerging discipline of artificial intelligence. 
To list just a few pieces of evidence, there is this journal computational linguistics, the 
subscription of which has increased at a rate totally unpredicted by its own editorial 
board. Many linguistics departments around the world are adding to their curriculum ever-
increasing number of computer-related courses. Furthermore not a few computer-science 
departments are adding to their curriculum linguistically-related courses. This is largely 
because of the potential that computer scientists see in the natural language-related re-
searches. Linguists have watched for several decades the health-science related research field 
with envy due to the magnonymous amount of funding that is poured into it. Quite a few 
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research proposals have been successfully made for the study of natural language data for 
the purpose of facilitating medical researches in recent years, for example. In this sort of 
researches, pragmatistic pragmatics plays a major role. 
Artificial intelligence field offers theory-oriented linguists excellent opportunities to 
pursue their researches to their hearts' satisfaction maintaining a well-paying job. One of 
my students wrote a computer program much like Joyce Friedman's PTQ English program, 
but in this student's case he w.rote a program on a Thai fragment comparable to Fried-
man's English fragment as a part of Montague-based machine translation project. With 
his Ph.D. in linguistics, he got a job at a large computer-science department. After teach-
ing two years and being offered a tenure, he accepted a position at the computer depart-
ment of General Motors working on a question-answer system for the employees. His pay 
now amounts to approximately triple as much as what assistant professors of linguistics 
are ·paid in an average linguistics department in the States. 
The area ip. which linguists can contribute much includes in addition to pragmatistic 
pragmatics the translation theory, . query system, knowledge representation area, formal 
lan~uage theory, formal semantics, theory-testing, theor~m proving, pattern recognition, 
etc. in sum, developing, improving, extending and generalizing from artificially intelligent 
systems. One episode from ~he University of Michigan illustrates just a side benefit of 
having the computer assistance in AI- related researches. While they were working on 
translation and reduction programs for the PTQ fragment, realizing that the .:I-reduction 
is possible for AvA (b) only when either b is modally closed or no free occurrence of 
variable v in A is in an intensional context, wished to find what sort of non-contractable 
f?rmulas there exist. So they wrote a program to print a message whenever it encountered 
a functional argument which is not modally closed. When this failed to show up any 
example over the course of time , they began to conjecture and eventually proved that 
the functional arguments in PTQ are always modally closed. 
Having experienced and still experiencing for that matter even now the difficulty 
of jumping across several disciplines without a proper background work, we feel that the 
time is ripe to help our new generation of linguists by providing a program to START 
them properly on the course of formal linguistics or natural-language related AI work. We, 
for example, at the University of Kansas have started a new subprogram in linguistics 
with curriculum organized with courses from mathematics, computer science, philosophy as 
well as linguistics tepered for that purpose that will prepare our future students for the 
kind of work we have talked about in the paper. I will be more than happy if I have 
been able to stimulate interest in some of you to look in the direction where the future 
of linguistics lies given time. 
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